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Critical Concepts 
Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘Habitus’ and the Political 
Economy of the Media  
 




F ew scholars have been cited in scholarly work as much as Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002). Bourdieu’s ideas have left a vigorous legacy in sociology and in anthropology, and have received ongoing, if more fitful, attention in fields as far flung as English, art, and communication. Famously de-
scribed as a theorist who was “good to think with”,1 Bourdieu’s ideas occasionally 
suffer for not lending themselves very directly to specific scholarly approaches. 
Many of his major ideas are so sweeping and all-inclusive as to become difficult to 
implement in a program of research. For those who, like me, argue in favor of 
adopting Bourdieu’s ideas for the study of communication, it is important to ad-
dress how his ideas can be applied to particular problems in the field. This is what I 
attempt to do here: to connect one of Bourdieu’s most widely-adopted ideas—that 
of habitus—with contemporary developments in the political economy of the me-
dia, with an emphasis on how habitus can help us to conceptualize much of what 
remains largely missing from political economy, without leading us down the road 
of mere scholasticism. 
I argue that the concept of habitus, when applied to questions of political econ-
omy of communication, points to a significant lacuna in much extant research con-
cerning political economy. Political economy of communication has focused 
largely on the structures and institutions that are thought to dominate the system of 
mediated communication. It is not much of an exaggeration to say that this focus on 
institutions has been the definitive central tendency in political economic work in 
communication. The incorporation of habitus into the theoretical mechanism of 
political economy will give us a sense of exactly how structural arrangements come 
to matter. After all, the Marxist quarry in this game should not be the names of the 
corporations that have consolidated, or a catalog of their joint ventures and syner-
gistic designs. If political economists are to understand processes of domination, 
the place to look would be at the practices made possible (and those made less pos-
sible) by these structural arrangements, as embodied by the producers and audience 
members themselves. Habitus could be the proper starting place for a reinvigorated 
political economy of communication. Its focus on the everyday, seemingly minor, 
and taken-for-granted aspects of life—on the micro-level—is what we should be 
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casting onto the screen of structural arrangements. We already have a solid sense of 
how macro-level details in the structure of the media matter to micro-level experi-
ences. Habitus allows us to close this hermeneutic circle: micro is the new macro. 
 
 
Habitus:  The Concept Itself 
 
Habitus is probably the best starting place for understanding Bourdieu’s ideas. 
Adapted for various uses in some of his best-known and relatively obscure work, 
the concept of habitus has demonstrated itself to have a flexibility that threatens to 
undermine its conceptual utility. Bourdieu developed the concept of habitus in an 
effort to get beyond the so-called structure/agency divide in the social sciences. 
This divide finds a particularly vigorous manifestation in communication, with its 
ongoing debates between scholars of media production and scholars of media re-
ception. There is reason to believe that use of the concept of habitus will allow po-
litical economists to develop a better set of answers to the more cogent critiques 
from the culturist camp in media studies. 
What is habitus?  It would be wrong to state that the word has one simple defi-
nition. In Bourdieu’s own work, one finds habitus to be an evolving concept, taking 
form in a dialectic with his diverse research interests. Michael Grenfell helpfully 
traces the use of the term back to Bourdieu’s early research concerning the lives of 
Béarn farmers, to his work in Les Héritiers, and in La Reproduction, where the 
concept of habitus “is used to express durable dispositions of individuals which 
guide social practice”.2 In Outline of a Theory of Practice, Bourdieu explains habi-
tus as a rejection of theories that “explicitly or implicitly treat practice as a me-
chanical reaction, directly determined by the antecedent conditions and entirely 
reducible to the mechanical functioning of pre-established assemblies,” while also 
rejecting the idea that “we should bestow on some creative free will the free and 
willful power to constitute, on the instant, the meaning of the situation by project-
ing the ends aiming at its transformation.”3 Bourdieu was very much concerned 
with overcoming a number of binary divisions in the social sciences, and habitus 
represents his attempt to incorporate both sides of the structure/agency debate.  
Turning now to brass-tacks definitions, Bourdieu explains that habitus  
 
is the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvi-
sations [which] produces practices which tend to reproduce the 
regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the produc-
tion of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands 
inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by 
the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus.4 
 
Though it is frustrating that Bourdieu here defines habitus in part by using the word 
‘habitus’ again, this is a starting point for the concept. We see here quite clearly 
how habitus is suggested as something closely linked to reproduction. The empha-
sis on reproduction is a little (not much) more clear in Bourdieu’s later description 
of habitus as 
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systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured struc-
tures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as 
principles which generate and organize practices and representa-
tions that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of 
the operations necessary in order to attain them.5 
 
This conception of habitus represents what Bourdieu has described as an attempt to 
get past, amongst other things, the opposition between objectivist and subjectivist 
accounts of practice; he saw these “two moments” standing “in a dialectical rela-
tionship.”6 
Habitus represents an attempt to draw attention to the relational component of 
everything social, without unmooring praxis from context. The concept of habitus, 
David Swartz argues, 
 
offers a programmatic research agenda for addressing the agency/
structure issue and points to an ideal-typical pattern of action. 
The research agenda derives from his theory that action is gener-
ated by the encounter between opportunities or constraints pre-
sented by situations and the durable dispositions that reflect the 
socialization of past experiences, traditions, and habits that indi-
viduals bring to situations.7 
 
This helpfully makes habitus a concept that can be, in a sense, plugged into all 
kinds of other research traditions, including political economy. 
Admitting that the idea of habitus, though very much relevant, is not particu-
larly comprehensible, for my purposes here I would describe habitus in terms of 
media processes. Take the production of media content. This content does not come 
out of the sky, nor does it come directly from an institution. It comes from practices 
that have emerged from past experience, are simultaneously constrained and en-
abled by structural arrangements (including legal, technical, and market conerns), 
and owe their existence to the strategic orientation of those whose labor is directly 
tied up with making media content. One of the most well-traveled hypotheticals for 
this would be the situation of the U.S. newspaper reporter, whose practices come 
not so much from the stated goals of a journalism school or a statement of profes-
sional values as from the day-to-day interactions with superiors and subordinates, 
sources and colleagues. Through this, the reporter (or any other producer of media 
content) gets a feel for the game: a feel that is embodied (and thus irreducible to 
simple logical-seeming rules) and a game that is taken seriously, though perhaps 
rarely understood in terms of the larger structural forces at play. 
Seen this way, habitus gives us a way of thinking about media content produc-
tion as something that owes its shape largely to structural arrangements, but also as 
something that plays out in praxis, in the everyday world of doing things. And for 
the political economist of communication, habitus tells us where to look for things 
like domination, hegemony, and reproduction. Much as Marx and Engels derided 
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the “German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth,” suggesting instead 
that we should “ascend from earth to heaven,”8 the concept of habitus gives us a 
way of getting down to the utterly practical, materialistic aspects of life that repre-
sent the best starting places for an analysis of political economy. In this sense, habi-
tus focuses our attention more squarely on issues that are only hinted at by the term 
‘praxis’. Habitus gets us past praxis, demanding that we not only take a materialist 
standpoint to understand what people do, but also examine how people conceptual-
ize their own behavior, as a specific variant of the field of possibles, and as this 
conceptualization relates to institutional and other power structures. 
For Bourdieu, habitus always operates in relation to fields of socially con-
structed position-takings. Here, the “task [for the researcher] is that of constructing 
the space of positions and the space of the position-takings in which they are ex-
pressed.”9 Habitus becomes the means by which the field becomes internalized, 
sedimented within us, with individuals occupying their own roles within the field, 
each reflecting differently off of other agents, hence the importance of relational 
thinking. Structure here becomes something that is given meaning to the extent that 
it is embodied in individuals. For this reason, a habitus-based analysis would exam-
ine structures at work not only on the broad level of institutions and corporations, 
but tie this macro-level understanding to the micro-level of praxis. Power is directly 
implicated in this model as, “by obeying the logic of the objective competition be-
tween mutually exclusive positions within the field, the various categories of pro-
ducers tend to supply products adjusted to the expectations of the various positions 
in the field of power, but without any conscious striving for such adjustment.”10 On 
the face of it, Bourdieu gives us with habitus a model for social reproduction and 
domination, a model that incorporates the focus on praxis that Marx’s base-
superstructure account leads to, while broadening the scope of analysis beyond eco-
nomics. It would be difficult to find a social theory that more fully addresses what 
Marx meant when he stated that people do not make history “as they please,” but 
only “under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the 
past.”11 Habitus represents Bourdieu’s attempt to get at the directness of this en-
counter of structurally-embedded social practice. 
Habitus can be linked up quite directly to institutions. Indeed, it is through habi-
tus that institutions reproduce the practices required for the social reproduction nec-
essary for social sustenance. As Beate Krais puts it, “[i]t is by habitus that the 
meaning objectified in institutions is reactiviated, that institutions are kept alive, 
but only by imposing the revisions and transformations that are counterpart and 
conditions of the reactivation.”12 In this sense, it is through habitus that institutions 
reproduce themselves (or reproduce the dispositions that make them possible), and 
it is through habitus that individuals develop the means through which to accom-
modate themselves to institutional needs/functions. 
The field of communication has, speaking broadly, done very little with the 
concept of habitus, or with other Bourdieu-ian ideas.13 There are also cases where 
communication scholars have argued that Bourdieu’s ideas can do little for political 
economy. No lesser political economist than Nicholas Garnham has expressed 
grave doubts regarding the importation of Bourdieu’s theoretical model to the 
realm of critical media research. Garnham’s critique is sweeping. He finds 
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Bourdieu to be too indebted to culturist explanations,14 and too much of a determi-
nist. In Bourdieu’s schema, Garnham finds “no room for the possibility of social 
experience producing radically critical alternative world views and political pro-
grams with a real purchase on the process of social change.”15 Whereas the 
“Marxist theory of knowledge…requires both the recognition of a real world and 
the possibility of its cognition in terms of a nonarbitrary and at least potentially 
universal classificatory schema within which a common set of truth claims can be 
accepted and values agreed upon,”16 Bourdieu’s habitus gives us what Garnham 
describes as an all-too-hermetically sealed social reality, a Durkheimian perpetual 
motion machine, all functionalism and no change. Other Bourdieu scholars paint a 
similar portrait of his ideas. David Swartz’s essential (and largely approving) re-
view of Bourdieu’s work casts him, I think, in a relatively Durkheimian light.17  
Speaking very broadly, there has been a pattern by which Bourdieu has been 
placed on one side of the debate (played out, mutatis mutandis, across the social 
sciences) between those who ask ‘what makes society possible?,’ and those 
(associated with the word ‘critical’) who inquire into power imbalances in society, 
and how to address them. From the point of view of communication scholarship, 
treating Bourdieu as a neo-Durkheimian with touches of Weber (as many do) 
blocks him off from critical scholarship. This should not be sufficient for communi-
cation. We are all familiar with James W. Carey’s ritual interpretation of reading 
the newspaper, which takes reading the newspaper “less as sending or gaining in-
formation and more as attending a mass, a situation in which nothing new is 
learned but in which a particular view of the world is portrayed and confirmed.”18 If 
habitus were only applicable to studies of this kind of reassertion of social order 
along the ritual dimension—which Carey himself did not propose—there would be 
good reason to presume that it could do little for more critical understandings of 
communication. Though one of the strengths of habitus is that it does help to ex-
plain the consent of the dominated, it also gives us something more than just an-
other tool for understanding how views of the world are ‘portrayed and confirmed.’ 
These characterizations of Bourdieu’s tend to isolate Bourdieu’s ideas from the 
political and social context in which Bourdieu functioned. Bourdieu’s later career 
as a (perhaps reluctant) public intellectual calls attention to his own belief in the 
possibility and importance of resistance. 
Furthermore, Bourdieu’s relevance to Marxist approaches to communication 
can easily be obscured by classifying him as a neo-Durkheimian. As I have argued 
elsewhere,19 Bourdieu’s ideas—and habitus is the exemplar of this—come largely 
out of a Marxist notion of praxis and reproduction. Bourdieu returns repeatedly20 to 
Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach, with its emphasis on “human sensuous activity” and 
“practice.”21 If a political economist of communication ever wanted ammunition in 
the ongoing dispute with more idealist modes of thought, Bourdieu’s emphasis on 
praxis understood as habitus offers an excellent place to start. At the same time, his 
conception of habitus proves to be much less rigid than Garnham imagined. Habi-
tus, after all, is not about rules being followed, and resistance to these rules so 
much as it is about the structures that are lived in, and conveyed through, everyday 
life. As such, habitus does not seal off resistance so much as it becomes the starting 
point for envisioning the possible forms that resistance could take. In this sense, 
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Garnham and other readers of Bourdieu mistake habitus for a list of rules that must 
be followed and reproduced. Linking habitus to political economy gives us one 
avenue for a more productive sense of the term. 
 
 
Habitus: The Political Economy Angle 
 
Much like habitus, the political economy of communication is a moving target. The 
political economy approach is associated with a wide range of theoretical stand-
points. Vincent Mosco has properly defined what political economy (of communi-
cation, and of anything else) involves. He offers a bona fide ‘big tent’ sense of po-
litical economy, examining the “central qualities that characterize the approach.”22 
One central quality is “the goal of understanding social change and historical trans-
formation.”23 Another is “an interest in examining the social whole or the totality of 
social relations that make up the economic, political, social, and cultural areas of 
life.”24 He finds that political economy “is also noted for its commitment to moral 
philosophy, understood as both an interest in the values that help to create social 
behavior and in those moral principles that ought to guide efforts to change it.”25 
Here Mosco emphasizes that “social praxis, or the fundamental unity of thinking 
and doing, also occupies a central place in political economy.”26 Mosco interprets 
this, rightly, as an indication that political economists are not, and should not, be 
content simply to allow scholarship and practice to be comfortably separate fields 
of activity. An even broader sense of what Mosco means here can link political 
economy’s goals with Bourdieu’s habitus. 
Mosco’s “rethinking” of political economy suggests that political economy be 
grounded in “critical epistemology.”27 By this he means that a renewed political 
economy approach “social life as a set of mutually constitutive processes, acting on 
one another in various stages of formation, and with a direction and impact that can 
be comprehended only in specific research.”28 In pursuit of this, he tells us that “it 
is…more useful to develop starting points that characterize processes rather than 
simply to identify relevant institutions.”29 Mosco points to commodification and 
hegemony as the starting points for a political economy conceptualized in this man-
ner. His discussion of commodification identifies praxis as the central concern, 
noting that, in its past treatments of commodification, “political economy has 
tended to concentrate on media content and less so on media structures and the la-
bor involved in media production.”30 He identifies recent research that has success-
fully expanded on the meaning of political economy, and lauds this research for 
having “broadened the analysis of audience research to examine audience history 
and the complex relationship of audiences to the producers of commercial culture, 
including the Internet.”31 In addition to commodification, Mosco tells us that struc-
turation represents an important starting point for his redefined political economy. 
Here, he points to the need to “[broaden] the conception of social class from its 
structural or categorical sense, which defines it in terms of what some have and 
others do not, to incorporate both a relational and a constitutional sense of the 
term.”32 It is under the rubric of structuration that Mosco identifies hegemony as an 
important part of the scholarship on political economy, describing hegemony as “a 
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lived network of mutually constituting meanings and values, which, as they are 
experienced as practices, appear to be mutually confirming.”33 
To return to Mosco’s grander point here (as I see it), a broader sense of the po-
litical economy of the media will focus less on the structures (institutions, organiza-
tions) per se, and more on the praxis connected to certain institutional arrange-
ments. Political economy of communication in the U.S. is often thought of in terms 
outlined by Herbert Schiller and Dallas Smythe, arguably the most influential po-
litical economists of communication. 
Herbert Schiller’s approach involves a kind of frank structuralism that could not 
link up more clearly with the goals of political action. Schiller kept a steady focus 
on large corporations, emphasizing the world of the “cultural industries.”34 Other 
institutions play a role in Schiller’s analysis. He paid careful attention to U.S. law, 
to the collusion between governments and large media corporations, to the con-
sumer goods producers, and to changes in technology as they adjust the control 
mechanisms of these institutions.35 Robert McChesney’s work similarly involves a 
steady focus on the same major factors, often working from detailed histories.36 
And, of course, Dallas Smythe’s ideas broadened the consideration of political 
economy dramatically, while still emphasizing the roles played by institutions in 
history.37 
If the concept of habitus is, as stated above, a word that points to the structuring 
structures that both constrain and generate the set of practices/strategies that are 
dispersed systematically and unevenly through a society, Bourdieu’s emphasis on 
praxis in habitus can be seen to link up with something quite similar to Mosco’s 
sweeping vision of political economy of communication. I am struck by the simi-
larity between Mosco’s ideas here and Bourdieu’s description of his own scholarly 
project as “a general science of the economy of practices.”38 We see tremendous 
overlap in political economy and Bourdieu’s ideas when we look at some of 
Bourdieu’s starting points:  the expansive sense of exchange, the similarly expan-
sive senses of ‘capital’ and of labor,39 his pointed critique of rational choice the-
ory,40 and the “anticipation of profits” from symbolic exchange.41 Though I restrain 
my comments here to the utility of the concept of habitus, this concept represents 
only a starting point for the integration of Bourdieu’s ideas with other materialist 
approaches. 
Here, I suggest two major arenas where the concept of habitus can be applied to 
the political economy of communication:  media production and media audiences. 
In the hands of a political economist, habitus can be thought of as the site of inter-
nalization of commodity relations in daily practices. This applies not just to knowl-
edge workers, but to everyone, to whole classes of people, where social relations 
and power are reified in daily actions structuring their choices and meanings as 
workers—who are tacitly bid to accept the terms of capital as doxa—and as con-
sumers, who practice meanings and values in relations essential to the cycle of 
capital.42 
Applying the concept of habitus to media production may seem relatively un-
controversial. In part, this is because some important work in political economy has 
already done much of the heavy lifting to get us closer to a sense of the fine mesh 
of praxis on the production side of media. Bernard Miège reminds us—in the con-
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text of the contemporary ‘information revolution’—of “the importance that com-
munication is presently gaining in the capitalist mode of production in the world 
economy in the context of globalization and liberalization.”43 One of the take-home 
points here is that the mode of production matters not only in terms of how large 
corporations and regulators relate to each other, but also in terms of how it shapes 
praxis, or, in the language of habitus, how it shapes the semi-conscious strategies at 
work in media labor. Similarly, Thomas Streeter has addressed how the field of 
possibilities was constructed culturally amongst the creators and managers of Inter-
net technologies in the 1990s.44 Dallas Smythe’s less recent ideas are relevant here, 
too. Crucial to Smythe’s sense of political economy of communication, after all, 
was a sense for how commodification operated in media markets to construct audi-
ences as commodities.45 In terms of how praxis operates on the production side of 
media, Smythe gets us beyond thinking only about regulations, corporations, and 
other large structures. What he was describing, after all, was how media producers 
come to understand and act toward audiences in specific ways, given the particular 
arrangements of corporate activity, and the over-arching demands of the capitalist 
marketplace. Smythe’s approach was something much closer to the more detailed 
political economy of labor that Mosco (above) calls on us to perform. 
A number of scholars have followed up vigorously (if not always explicitly) on 
Smythe’s work, exploring at length the idea of how audiences have been commodi-
fied. Again, we find reason to believe that habitus can help us to address (if not 
resolve) questions in political economy of communication. Eileen R. Meehan, fol-
lowing clearly from Smythe, argued that television and radio ratings represent a 
kind of domination of the audience, where the process of commodification of peo-
ple has significant meaning for how media texts are produced.46 W. Russell Neu-
man tells a familiar story of how ratings create imperatives for programmers to 
ignore minority tastes so as to capture large audiences.47 James Beniger’s “control 
revolution” described something very similar to this, and though Beniger’s empha-
sis is more Weberian than Marxian, one can detect the same sense of commodifica-
tion of the audience at work. Fernando Bermejo’s description of how Internet audi-
ences are constructed and commodified represents a clear (and productive) sense 
for how the ideas of Smythe and Beniger can be joined in an effort to analyze the 
sens practique at work in constructing audiences.48 
The application of the concept of habitus to questions of political economy help 
us to explain why the larger structural arrangements matter. In terms of habitus, 
structural arrangements do not so much matter in and of themselves, but matter a 
great deal in terms of how they arrange action, construct sets of possibles, tacitly 
introduce forms of self-censorship, and embody (literally) the rules of the game. 
From this vantage point, the capitalist mode of production matters in terms of its 
power to install doxa—taken-for-granted bits of knowledge—in the bodies of 
knowledge laborers, and it is the job of the political economist to attempt to un-
cover these doxa, not as ideologies, but as lived habits that emerge from the social 
structure. It would be wrong to say that the grander structural arrangements do not 
matter, but certainly it is hard to understand how they matter without paying atten-
tion to how producers relate to their labor. As with Marx’s cobbler, the effect of 
alienation comes from his relation to his labor, as it changes as a result of the devel-
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opment of modern capitalism; simply telling us who owns the shoe factory does not 
give us the whole story. 
Applications of habitus to media production are admittedly not easy to find. The 
term seems to resist importation into communication. Eric Darras has applied habi-
tus to the situation of French journalists, where the “structural subordination of the 
journalistic field is made possible by journalistic self-censorship via the more or 
less confused absorption of the relative importance of political institutions (the con-
stitution, the government, the Congress, the dominant parties, and especially in 
France, the National School for Administration…).”49 As Darras puts it, the “most 
productive journalists are those who have best assimilated the theodicies that sup-
port representative government and the social system as a whole (the real power of 
politicians; the political participation of the ‘people’; the ‘separation of powers’; 
etc.).”50 For Darras, habitus in journalism operates as a way to find the institution in 
the agent; in a sense applying constructivist insights to structural arrangements. I 
would argue that Dan Schiller’s Objectivity and the News does much the same 
thing, taking structural arrangements in the press and demonstrating how they be-
came implicated in the practices—such as the practice of objective reporting—
became the practical consequence in day-to-day reporting.51 Gaye Tuchman’s study 
of objectivity in the press gives us, in this sense, a similar accounting of objectivity, 
as a strategic ritual that has emerged from structural arrangements, half-understood 
by the journalists themselves.52 
The broader point to be taken from these studies that either use habitus (perhaps 
at arm’s length) or represent parallels to habitus-based analyses is as follows:  First, 
institutions do matter, just as political economists of communication have said for 
years. Second, the mode in which these institutions matter may be more compli-
cated than political economists have usually presumed. Instead of operating merely 
through blunt ‘control’ (though there is that, too), it is the oft-misrecognized prac-
tices—and the actor’s broader habitus, obtained from schooling, learning the ropes, 
etc.—at every step in the chain of production where the action is. The political 
economist of communication, following Bourdieu’s lead, would take the existing 
structural arrangements into account, but then the foregrounded analysis would 
focus not on the Bagdikian-ian questions of who owns what, but on the meaningful-
because-prosaic facts of production, from the point of view of the laborer. As is 
clear from these canonical examples from the study of journalism, this has been 
done before, but there is much room for further analysis from political economists. 
Production is not the only part of the communication process to play a role in 
the habitus-informed political economy of communication. Bourdieu was very clear 
in pointing out that production takes the form that it does largely because of the 
proleptic assessment of audience response. In this sense (and this is largely congru-
ent with insights from the structuration approach in political economy), audience 
members are themselves part of the game. We can benefit from no small amount of 
audience-based research on communication when considering how to apply habitus 
to the political economy of communication. Richard Butsch’s history of U.S. audi-
ences from mid-eighteenth through late twentieth centuries tells us much about how 
audiences have been constructed by producers, expected to behave, and related to 
media texts. In his conclusion, he emphasizes the ambiguities of audience practice, 
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noting that “[a]n audience practice may be at one level resistant and another in-
corporative, at one level and another passive, at one private and individual and an-
other public and collective.”53 Roger Silvertone’s attempts to document the 
“experience of television in all its dailiness, in all its factuality”54 gets at some of 
what makes reception a structured and structuring affair, quite apropos of 
Bourdieu’s habitus. David Morley’s work takes a similar approach, examining how 
social structure relates to audiences’ interpretive frameworks, with a particular con-
cern for getting past television as ‘text’.55 Through reference to audience research, 
itself often taken (wrongly) as a prolonged and populist rebuttal of political econ-
omy of communication, one can find some sense of how emphasizing media praxis 
gives us a more refined sense of the operations of power in the media. 
With habitus in mind, the political economist has a reinvigorated sense of how 
audiences relate to power. The audience experience can be re-envisioned in terms 
of how it involves audience members’ pre-existing sense of possibilities for what is 
deemed:  entertaining, informative, objective, satisfying, or inoffensive. For some 
very good reasons, this kind of research would resemble the kinds of audience re-
search that builds on Gramscian models of hegemony. Like Gramsci, Bourdieu 
emphasized doxa as common sense, and identified this as a major part of the social 
processes of reproduction and domination. Unlike many uses of Gramsci, however, 
an incorporation of habitus into the perspective of political economy would move 
scholarship away from discourse and ideology, and toward praxis.56 
A decent sense of what the focus on habitus can do for the political economy of 
audiences could be envisioned in terms of an issue that Robert Entman describes at 
work in journalism, whereby something like Say’s Law—in which supply creates 
its own demand—can be found in effect. Entman argues that it is difficult for the 
public to demand better journalism if they have not been exposed to better journal-
ism. In the journalistic field, Entman finds a market that is limited by the fact that 
the consumers do not know how to pursue options that the market itself has never 
made available to them.57 Robert W. McChesney describes the same process, and 
concludes that “[t]here is no way to use the market to express nonmarket values—
aside from withdrawing from media altogether—which is hardly an option, nor 
should it be.”58 This is an important insight, but it leaves much left to the imagina-
tion regarding how exactly the audience has come to demand that which has been 
supplied. Habitus may provide some of the answer. 
Through a consideration of habitus, we could attempt to understand processes 
of production and reception as reciprocally-structuring (which is not to say that 
audiences and producers have equal power) events in the communication process, 
whereby audience members come to develop a sense of the possible through re-
peated exposure to a specific field of options. From these options, individuals de-
velop a sense not only of what is possible, but also of where they fit in, and how 
their own consumption habits can yield the kind of symbolic profits they hope to 
gain. This is the “sense of the game” that Bourdieu described so often, and it is 
what programmers attempt to account for in their increasingly detailed research 
about media markets. Media supply creates its own demand as media markets be-
come more carefully attuned to specific institutional arrangements, which is to say, 
as media producers’ gambits yield certain successes (in the form of sales or rat-
Democratic Communiqué 23, No. 1, Spring 2009 10 
10
Democratic Communiqué, Vol. 23 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique/vol23/iss1/1
ings), and then capitalize on previous successes with other similar programming 
strategies. This ‘herd mentality’ of producers is one of the most enduring insights 
into the political economy of communication.59 In terms of habitus, it represents the 
coalescence of certain strategies for programming, which are rewarded for past 
successes; programmers internalize the logic of the particular market in an almost 
content-neutral manner. On the audience side, supply creates its own demand as 
audience members themselves internalize the options made available to them as the 
entirety of the field of possibilities, and “aestheticize the necessary,”60 find them-
selves without other options, and demand that which has been assigned to them. 
This is rule-like behavior, though, pace Bourdieu, almost no one (from producers to 
audience members) is following any uttered rule. It is emergent practice, self-
perpetuating, and not as stable as it seems within the terms it offers for itself. 
The application of habitus to media consumption and reception is not com-
pletely new. As with studies of production, there is more to be done, and again, the 
emphasis on praxis represents the hope and the difficulty of this kind of scholar-
ship. There is some good news, however. If political economists apply habitus to 
reception, they will have answered some of the oft-repeated arguments made by 
those who claim that political economy treats communication as if it were exactly 
like every other industry. Greater attention to the processes of meaning construction 
will give political economists something more to say when faced with the charge 
that political economic models deny the experience of the audience. What political 
economists need to do is not so much force the existing ways of thinking about 
media into audience studies so much as to allow their own understandings of power 
to become less brittle, more open to the embodied modes of multiple sites of power. 
This will not end the debate with cultural studies over final determination of mean-
ing. However, it may lead to more meaningful interactions between different 
schools of thought on the issue, as opposed to the methodologically predetermined 




Habitus and the Methodology of Political Economy  
 
More than one daunting question haunts the effort to incorporate Bourdieu’s habi-
tus into a program for political economy of communication. One of the most impor-
tant for scholars would be this:  what methods should be used to study habitus as it 
relates to political economy? 
In considering the answer to this question, one finds a renewed appreciation for 
large-scale structural political economic studies. Herbert Schiller’s work, for in-
stance, suffers from frustrating gaps in its attempt to address the communication 
process. Still, he and others from the institutionalist school of political economy 
successfully found a method for studying media power that called attention to sys-
tems of domination without sealing off the potential for resistance. Much of this 
work benefits from the social scientific legitimacy that is associated with looking at 
structures, itself indirectly linked to mainstream trends in sociology.61 
The successes of existing political economic models of communication throw 
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into high relief some of the problems that come from thinking about habitus. To 
study habitus as it relates to political economy of communication would be much 
better if habitus were, in the language of social science, a more readily operational-
ized concept. To be blunt:  we do not have tools for measuring habitus directly. 
Even more frustratingly, the concept of habitus invites a kind of reflexivity that 
challenges the very idea of a neutral standpoint from which to understand the work-
ings of any particular practical sense of the world. As Bourdieu made very clear, 
the workings of habitus are not suspended in the world of science, or of social sci-
ence.62  
Still, Bourdieu clearly intended this as a provocation, an ‘invitation to reflexiv-
ity,’ and not as a rejection of the possibility of knowing. In this spirit, I suggest that 
the methods of political economy of communication should retain the macro sense 
of institutional structures, but match this with careful attention to strategies of me-
dia production and consumption as conceptualized in terms of habitus. The meth-
ods for this kind of study have been executed in the context of political economy 
before, but are more widely associated with cultural studies and organizational 
communication. 
Here it is worth considering the methods that Bourdieu himself used in the 
course of his career. He was justifiably well known for employing numerous meth-
ods. He started off largely as a field researcher; his formulations of the term habitus 
come largely from his research on the Kabyle in Algeria.63 In his work amongst the 
Kabyle, one finds exactly the kind of emphasis on nuance and praxis that field re-
search should involve. It is worth pointing out that similar field-based research can 
retain a critical perspective. Critical ethnography, as described by Jim Thomas,64 
gives us a good sense of how a qualitative and field-based methodology can be 
linked with specific critical ends. The lessons of critical ethnography are apposite 
for the attempt to bridge habitus with political economy, an attempt already made 
quite successfully by Manjunath Pendakur, who helpfully outlined how ethnogra-
phy could inform political economy in his analysis of media audiences in an Indian 
village.65 
Qualitative methods were not the only arrows in Bourdieu’s quiver. He was no 
stranger to survey research, and much of his work that dealt with social class—
including his work with Passeron on French educational structures and Distinc-
tion—involved a careful use of survey data. Survey data were not simply dumped 
into hypotheses, but were pored over, to be taken relationally, as Bourdieu repeat-
edly and rigorously attempted to construct the fields of possibilities in which social 
actors lived. 
For political economists of communication, the methodological significance of 
Bourdieu’s work is its insistence on refusing to dissolve anything in a solution of 
ideological analyses, and on focusing on praxis and lived experience. From a 
Bourdieu-ian point of view, a focus on media institutions and structures simply 
would not be sufficient, because of this focus’s lack of attention to everyday praxis. 
Knowledge about political and corporate bodies and the formal rules they propa-
gate does not tell us very much about precisely how domination is worked out. Fur-
thermore, Bourdieu’s ideas provide us with a way to get past the economic deter-
minism in some strains of Marxian thought. Instead of responding to the problems 
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of economic determinism through an embrace of populist assertions of agency, 
Bourdieu’s broader sense of domination turns domination into a more multivariate 
affair, where degrees of autonomy do exist in the confines of specific fields, and 
economics is not always the prime mover. 
It is worth pointing out that the methodological refinements to be undertaken in 
a political economy that builds on Bourdieu’s ideas would allow political economy 
greater flexibility to understand new media. Here, notice that Dallas Smythe’s 
ideas, for instance, were created in the context of advertising-driven mass media of 
the 1970s. This straightforward mass communication approach was utterly appro-
priate for that time, and though Smythe’s model remains relevant, political econ-
omy generally seems tied to models that presume the anti-democratic tendencies in 
the asymmetry between large mass communication corporations and dominated 
audiences. 
One response to this, of course, might be to presume that, in the age of new 
media, corporate control does not matter any more. Henry Jenkins argues some-
thing similar to this in his recent Convergence Culture, where he paints a picture of 
a new media environment where the line between producers and consumers has 
become almost non-existent. Jenkins fends off any who might accuse him of tech-
nological determinism by pointing to the long history of convergence. For Jenkins, 
the “collective intelligence” that is fostered in the current media environment is not 
something that emanates from the technology per se, but from the users and pro-
ducers themselves, acting in harmony.66 Political economists have been quick to 
point out that Jenkins confines his discussion only to certain rarefied parts of new 
media practice, and that structural issues are essentially defined out of his project. 
I propose that political economists address new media much as Vincent Mosco 
suggests, with a broad sense of domination at work in the practical, interstitial parts 
of the process of mediation, with less of a focus on ownership models of power. 
The best response to Jenkins’ ideas, I think, would be to apply his same methods 
(e.g. ethnography) to different parts of the media production/consumption contin-
uum. Clearly, we still need to understand ownership and institutional control in the 
current ‘new’ media regime. However, the modes of domination at work have 
rarely more clearly made praxis the central concern. What would Bourdieu do?  
Amongst other things, he would probably point out that the types of practice that 
Jenkins hails as a rather positive development of convergence culture are not 
evenly distributed, and that “produsage” itself represents a potential tool for domi-
nation, as a potential form of misrecognition of a less than democratically arranged 
set of relationships. 
More precisely, new media currently give us a rare chance to understand praxis, 
because they often find the media industry changing how they do things. Methodol-
ogically, it is in a sense fortunate that new media bring with them new ways of pro-
ducing and receiving culture. A moment of cultural-technological change may give 
us the opportunity to unravel some of what has been going on—and some of what 
is coming—in the world of praxis. I suggest that many of Bourdieu’s favorite 
themes in his research (misrecognition, le sens practique, adjustments in fields of 
play) become more accessible to the researcher when they are in flux. For instance, 
the popular music industry is currently experiencing difficult times. Old models for 
13 Critical Concepts / Park 
13
Park: Critical Concepts: Pierre Bourdieu's 'Habitus' and the Political
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2021
generating profit no longer work like they used to, new media have not been effi-
ciently monetized yet, the existing laws for intellectual property still highlight con-
tradictions in the field more than the industry would prefer. For the agents in-
volved—including audience members and consumers—this represents a time when 
well-worn subject positions become describable simply because they do not work 
as seamlessly as they once did. Bourdieu’s strategies, in this context, become some-
what more explicitly thought-out because the existing models guiding practice have 
broken down. For the political economist of communication, it would be a pity in a 
moment like this to focus only on institutions when the attempt to structure praxis 
in the day-to-day has become fleetingly available. Of course, it would also be a pity 
to give in to the “digital sublime”67 and assume that these institutions have sud-
denly become irrelevant. In this sense, new media provide new opportunities for 





When considering the relevance of habitus to the political economy of communica-
tion, it is worthwhile to consider the upswing of this protean idea in terms of the 
modes of political action it may enable and/or stifle. As I have already related, 
Garnham has suggested that Bourdieu’s ideas—including habitus—were too total-
izing, too much lacking in any sense of political possibility to be of much use to 
anyone with a political program in mind. His critique of Bourdieu’s ideas closely 
resembles the critiques of functionalist and pragmatist inquiry in the social sci-
ences. Much as both functionalism and pragmatism have been critiqued from the 
left for simply making it seem as if ‘that which is, is good,’ habitus threatens to 
become so broadly applicable and merely descriptive as to be useless for political 
action.  
It makes some sense to examine how some forms of political economical in-
quiry do link up with political action. The most obvious and helpful case would be  
the structuralist political economy I have described above. In Robert McChesney’s 
work, for instance, activism flows directly from the analysis. Classically, McChes-
ney puts powerful institutions into historical perspective, shows us how their inter-
ests conflict with the interests of the public, and then links this to activism that 
takes dead aim at these institutions. The activist network Free Press grew out of a 
(correct) sense that large institutions matter, that their control over communication 
processes has become problematic, and that we need activism to change the exist-
ing power structures. As Steve Macek points out, FreePress has “discovered effec-
tive ways of connecting critical communication research to political action, and has 
figured out how to mobilize enormous number of people to fight for a more democ-
ratic, more equitable media system.”68 
In light of this, it is perfectly appropriate to wonder how such a scholarly-
seeming term as habitus can create any leverage for activists. I believe there are at 
least two things that habitus can help us accomplish as activist scholars:  it can help 
us to notice the commonalities that link the interests of knowledge workers, and it 
can allow us to gain a sense of reflexivity in our politics. 
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First, using habitus as a starting point in political economy of communication 
calls attention to the practices of everyday life. Perfectly consistent with this would 
be a growing realization of how communication scholars and other knowledge 
workers are parts of overlapping, if not identical, processes in the emergent eco-
nomic order. Here the key term is ‘knowledge labor.’ Vincent Mosco describes 
numerous definitions of knowledge labor, almost all of which include professors 
and teachers. He then outlines how the very term knowledge labor creates a poten-
tial for solidarity between professors and other knowledge workers, broadly de-
fined. This emphasis may be especially important if “labor convergence” is indeed 
a going concern.69 This does not instantly mean that academics can now comforta-
bly define themselves as blue collar. As Mosco explains, “[m]yths that conjure one 
big union of knowledge workers have their values, but can get seriously in the way 
of thinking clearly.”70 And this brings us back to Bourdieu. The very idea of knowl-
edge labor re-works Marxian ideas about class to the point where it may make 
sense to hold on to Marx’s emphasis on praxis, while departing from his more pro-
crustean sense of class. Bourdieu’s habitus preserves the focus on praxis, domina-
tion, and reproduction, while allowing a more flexible definition of class, in a man-
ner that dovetails smoothly into the questions faced by knowledge workers. 
The second thing habitus can do for activist scholars is to point the way to re-
flexivity in our scholarship and our activism. That Bourdieu saw scholarship as 
something that could link up with political action is apparent in the arc of his ca-
reer. An elite sociologist for years, he became a more outspoken public intellectual 
toward the end of his life. This later turn to public intellectual work did not come 
out of nowhere, and one lesson to be drawn from this may relate to Bourdieu’s 
grander concern with reflexivity; in many ways, Bourdieu could be said to have 
taken careful note of his own position in the social topography when considering 
his own public activism. He was very much interested in the idea of autonomy and 
of its opposite:  heteronomy. Wary of simply plugging himself into a media land-
scape that he described in On Television as a threat to the autonomies of politics 
and journalism from the laws of the market,71 Bourdieu seems to have carefully 
chosen when to speak, how to speak, and how to, in his own terms, ‘anticipate prof-
its.’ 
Examples of what is to be gained by using habitus as an analytic tool are not so 
difficult to envision. First, use of the term would allow activists to redirect efforts 
already focused on concentration of media ownership. While concentration remains 
an important issue for activism, habitus would lend itself to an adjusted activist 
approach, one that would focus less on concentration per se than on structures of 
labor and meaning that emerge from capitalist media enterprise. This would give 
activists more to say about markets where there may be more competition. Activ-
ism that starts with habitus as a concern need not address only the parts of the me-
dia landscape that feature more obvious concentration of media ownership. Instead, 
the focus would be placed (re-placed, some might say) on how capitalism lends 
itself to certain practices, content management, and production that conflict with 
democratic ideals. Such activism would focus less on News Corporation or Com-
cast, and more on the processes that made such corporatization possible in the first 
place. 
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Similarly, activism stemming from the concept of habitus could start with a 
sense of the commonalities between media scholars and other media laborers. Here, 
there are two questions to be faced by any potential media scholar/activist:  First, 
whose interests are supported by my work?  Second, with what parties can I find 
common cause in the search for democracy?  The first question demands that media 
scholars inquire into their own sources of support, the structures from which they 
draw strength, and how these relate to the questions they ask. It is not very contro-
versial to point out that some media scholars will find that they have much in com-
mon with market researchers, media planners and buyers, and administrators who 
seek to perpetuate the existing order of things. The results of such analysis may 
prove unsettling, but are a necessary starting place for an autonomous scholarship 
of the media. The second question lines up media scholars’ understandings of their 
own work with the places occupied by other media laborers (broadly construed), 
and leads us to consider how the structures (in and around us) that shape us also 
shape media workers of all stripes, including web designers, screenwriters, journal-
ists, and the surprisingly broad swath of laborers whose work often goes unac-
knowledged as media-relevant (e.g. the employees of UPS). For all of this, the em-
phasis on habitus leads to a more informed conception of the struggles of which we 
are already a part (whether we know it or not). 
Surprisingly consistent with the goal of reflexivity, which Bourdieu considered 
to be “the absolute prerequisite to any political action by intellectuals,”72 was 
Bourdieu’s own goal of creating “new forms of communication between research-
ers and activists.”  The goal here was not to formulate a specific program for re-
search or political action, but to do something grander:  to create structures to give 
to social research the kind of (relative) autonomy from market forces that any such 
form of inquiry would require. Political economy of communication would, in this 
sense, benefit from turning to the public, taking common cause with knowledge 
workers and other workers (the distinction between the two has never been less 
distinct), and setting itself to the understanding of the prosaic workings of eco-
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